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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McLAUGHLIN, District Judge. 
 
Prior to its amendment effective September 13, 1994, 18 
U.S.C. S922(j) made it unlawful "for any person to ... sell[ ] 
or dispose of any stolen firearm ... which has been shipped 
or transported in [interstate commerce], knowing or having 
reasonable cause to believe that the firearm ... was stolen." 
18 U.S.C.A. S922(j) (West 1976) and Historical and 
Statutory Notes to 1990 Amendment (West Supp. 1998). 
Appellant Cyrus Sanders, Jr. was convicted in the United 
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
for violations of this provision upon entering a plea of guilty 
to charges of trafficking and conspiring to traffic in stolen 
firearms. It is undisputed that the transactions for which 
Sanders was convicted involved the sale and disposal of 
firearms that had entered the stream of interstate 
commerce prior to their theft, but not thereafter. 
 
Sanders now appeals the District Court's denial of his 
motion to set aside, correct, or vacate his sentence under 
28 U.S.C. S2255. Appellant claims that his counsel was 
ineffective in advising him to plead guilty to the trafficking 
charges inasmuch as the applicable version of S922(j) did 
not prohibit his particular conduct. We are thus called 
upon to determine whether S922(j), prior to its amendment 
in 1994, was intended to apply to transactions in stolen 
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firearms where the weapons moved in interstate commerce 
only prior to being stolen. We conclude that it was. 
Accordingly, we affirm the District Court's order. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
On January 24, 1996, a federal grand jury in 
Pennsylvania returned a four-count indictment against 
Sanders charging him with conspiracy to possess afirearm 
as a convicted felon and to traffic in stolenfirearms [Count 
I], possession of a firearm by a convicted felon [Count II], 
trafficking in stolen firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
S922(j) [Count III], and retaliating against a witness [Count 
IV]. The government alleged that, between September 1990 
and April 1994, Sanders conspired with two other 
individuals to burglarize several residences in remote 
locations. Once inside the residences, Sanders and his 
cohorts would steal items with potential resale value, 
including firearms. Other firearms were obtained by 
providing false information to legitimate gun dealers. In all, 
a total of forty-four guns ultimately were attributed to 
Sanders. These firearms were sold to private individuals 
and legitimate dealers, often at gun shows. All of the 
firearms at issue were disposed of in Pennsylvania and 
never entered interstate commerce after Sanders came into 
possession of them. 
 
The scheme finally ended after one of Sanders's fellow 
conspirators was arrested and began cooperating with law 
enforcement officials. Following his own indictment, 
Sanders agreed to plead guilty to the charges of trafficking 
and conspiring to traffic in stolen firearms on the advice of 
his attorney. In exchange for his plea, the remaining 
charges against him were dismissed. The District Court 
subsequently sentenced Sanders to a seventy-month term 
of incarceration. 
 
On January 14, 1998 Sanders filed a motion to set aside, 
correct, or vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S2255. Sanders claims that he committed no violation of 
the law with respect to the trafficking charges set forth in 
Counts I and III and, therefore, his attorney was ineffective 
in advising him to plead guilty to those charges. More 
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specifically, Sanders contends that the version of 18 U.S.C. 
S922(j) in effect at the time of his conduct required that the 
firearms which are the subject of the trafficking offense 
enter interstate commerce as stolen firearms, i.e., after 
being stolen. Sanders further claims that he was prejudiced 
by his counsel's ineffectiveness. He theorizes that, if he had 
been able to successfully challenge the trafficking charges 
under Counts I and III, he might have had an additional 
"bargaining chip" with which to negotiate a better plea offer. 
 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
We have jurisdiction over the instant appeal pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. S2255 and S1291. United States v. Cleary, 46 
F.3d 307, 309 (3d Cir. 1995). Because our disposition of 
this appeal ultimately turns on an interpretation of 
statutory law, we apply a plenary standard of review. See 
Parrish v. Fulcomer, 150 F.3d 326, 328 (3d Cir. 1998) (legal 
component of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in 
the habeas context is subject to plenary review) (addressing 
claim under 28 U.S.C. S2254). 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
A. 
 
Initially, we must address the government's argument 
that Sanders has procedurally defaulted his present claim 
by failing to raise it either in the District Court or on direct 
appeal. "Where a defendant has procedurally defaulted a 
claim by failing to raise it on direct review, the claim may 
be raised in habeas only if the defendant can first 
demonstrate either `cause' and `actual prejudice,' ... or that 
he is `actually innocent.' " Bousely v. United States, ___ U.S. 
___, ___, 118 S. Ct. 1604, 1611 (1998) (internal citations 
omitted). We will limit our inquiry, as the parties have, to 
the issue of whether Sanders has shown "cause" and 
"actual prejudice" for his procedural default.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In light of our disposition of this appeal, Sanders would be unable in 
any event to establish his "actual innocence" with respect to the S922(j) 
charges. 
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Sanders contends that he can establish "cause" by virtue 
of his counsel's ineffectiveness in advising him to plead 
guilty to the trafficking and conspiracy charges under 
Counts I and III of the indictment. A showing of 
ineffectiveness of counsel which rises to the level of a 
constitutional deprivation can indeed constitute the type of 
prejudice that will excuse procedural default. See Murray v. 
Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986); Sistrunk v. Vaughn, 96 
F.3d 666, 675 (3d Cir. 1996) (state prisoner habeas claim); 
United States v. Essig, 10 F.3d 968, 979 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(recognizing principle but declining to consider it on 
appeal). Accord United States v. Guerra, 94 F.3d 989, 993- 
94 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Cook, 45 F.3d 388, 392 
(10th Cir. 1995). To prevail on such a claim, however, a 
defendant must show both that counsel's performance fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness under 
prevailing professional norms and that counsel's 
deficiencies prejudiced him. See Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Sistrunk, 96 F.3d at 670. 
 
The district judge rejected Sanders's ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim based on a two-part analysis. First, the 
judge observed that the government had acquired 
overwhelming evidence of Sanders's guilt. He therefore 
considered it reasonable for defense counsel to presume 
that Sanders would ultimately be convicted by a jury. The 
district judge then engaged in a lengthy and detailed 
analysis of the potential ramifications of Sanders's plea 
agreement for purposes of sentencing. He essentially 
predicted that Sanders benefitted from his plea agreement 
because he faced less potential jail time than he might 
otherwise have faced if convicted on the felon-in-possession 
charge under Count II of the Indictment. In light of these 
circumstances, the judge found that defense counsel acted 
reasonably in not moving to dismiss the trafficking charge 
and instead advising Sanders to plead guilty to that charge 
and the related conspiracy charge. 
 
On appeal, Sanders argues that, regardless of the District 
Court's ex post calculation of his supposed sentence on 
Counts I, II, and IV, he would have been in a better plea 
bargaining position to receive a shorter sentence if Count III 
and part of Count I had been dismissed. However, we need 
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not reach this issue. Because we conclude that Sanders did 
in fact engage in prohibited conduct under Counts I and III 
of the indictment, it necessarily follows that Sanders's 
counsel was not ineffective in advising him to plead guilty 
to those charges rather than attempting to have them 
dismissed. It further follows that Sanders's S2255 claim 
would inevitably fail on the merits, as he can demonstrate 
no legitimate basis for withdrawal of his guilty plea or for 
vacating his sentence. We turn, then, to our examination of 
the operative statutory provision. 
 
B. 
 
It is undisputed that the conduct for which Sanders was 
charged occurred between September 1990 and April 1994. 
The parties therefore agree that, for purposes of this case, 
we must apply 18 U.S.C. S922(j) as it existed following its 
amendment in 1990 and prior to its amendment effective 
September 13, 1994. See 18 U.S.C.A. S922(j) (West 1976) 
and Historical and Statutory Notes to S922, 1990 
Amendment (West Supp. 1998). This version of S922(j) 
reads as follows: 
 
       It shall be unlawful for any person to receive, conceal, 
       store, barter, sell, or dispose of any stolen firearm or 
       stolen ammunition, or pledge or accept as security for 
       a loan any stolen firearm or stolen ammunition, which 
       is moving as, which is a part of, which constitutes, or 
       which has been shipped or transported in, interstate or 
       foreign commerce, knowing or having reasonable cause 
       to believe that the firearm or ammunition was stolen. 
 
Id. 
 
Sanders interprets the foregoing language to mean that 
the subject firearm must have traveled in interstate 
commerce as a stolen firearm -- i.e., the theft must have 
occurred prior to the stolen firearm's movement in 
interstate commerce. The government interprets this same 
language to mean only that the firearm which is the subject 
of the trafficking offense must have passed in interstate 
commerce at some time, whether before or after it was 
stolen. The significance of these differing interpretations is 
clear. Under the first interpretation, Sanders did not 
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commit a violation of S922(j) because the firearms of which 
he disposed never passed through interstate commerce 
after he stole them. Under the government's interpretation, 
Sanders did in fact commit a violation of S922(j) and, 
therefore, his counsel could not have been ineffective in 
failing to have those charges dismissed. 
 
In ascertaining the meaning of a statutory provision, we 
are instructed to "look not only to the particular statutory 
language, but to the design of the statute as a whole and 
to its object and policy." Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 
152, 158 (1990) (citations omitted). See also McElroy v. 
United States, 455 U.S. 642, 658 (1982) (Court looks to 
statutory language and legislative history in determining 
Congress's intent). If a "reasonable doubt persists about a 
statute's intended scope even after resort to `the language 
and structure, legislative history, and motivating policies' of 
the statute," Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 
(1990) (emphasis in original), then the rule of lenity applies 
and the statute is to be narrowly construed. Id. (citations 
omitted); Crandon, 494 U.S. at 158. 
 
On its face, S922(j) appears to be susceptible to two 
alternative interpretations. On the one hand, it can be 
argued that the phrase "which has been shipped or 
transported in [interstate commerce]" modifies only the 
word "firearm" and that the term "stolen firearm" merely 
indicates the status of the firearm at the time of the 
proscribed transaction. This is the view adopted by the 
government. The result of this interpretation is that an 
offense is committed when a stolen firearm is sold, disposed 
of, etc. by one having reason to know that it was stolen, as 
long as the firearm passed through interstate commerce at 
some time, whether before or after its theft. On the other 
hand, Sanders urges that the phrase "which has been 
shipped or transported in [interstate commerce]" modifies 
the phrase "stolen firearm," such that thefirearm must 
have moved through interstate commerce as a stolen 
firearm. We view each of these proposed interpretations as 
facially plausible. 
 
If there is any ambiguity in the language of S922(j), 
however, we think it is resolved by reference to the 
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legislative history. It is instructive to note the prior version 
of S922(j) which, until its amendment in 1990, stated: 
 
       It shall be unlawful for any person to receive, conceal, 
       store, barter, sell, or dispose of any stolen firearm or 
       stolen ammunition, or pledge or accept as security for 
       a loan any stolen firearm or stolen ammunition, which 
       is moving as, which is a part of, or which constitutes, 
       interstate or foreign commerce, knowing or having 
       reasonable cause to believe that the firearm or 
       ammunition was stolen. 
 
Federal courts applying this provision had interpreted it as 
requiring two elements: first, the firearm's movement 
through interstate commerce had to be on-going at the time 
of the underlying trafficking offense, see United States v. 
Jones, 564 F.2d 1315, 1316 (9th Cir. 1977), United States 
v. Ruffin, 490 F.2d 557, 560-61 (8th Cir. 1974); and 
second, the firearm had to be stolen at the time of its 
movement through interstate commerce. See United States 
v. West, 562 F.2d 375, 377-78 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 
435 U.S. 922 (1978). 
 
In 1990 Congress amended S922(j) so as to include 
within its scope firearms "which ha[ve] been shipped or 
transported in [interstate commerce]." Pub.L. 101-647 
S2202(a). It is clear from the legislative history that this 
amendment was intended to expand the jurisdiction of 
federal courts by broadening the scope of the interstate 
commerce nexus. In addressing the amendment before the 
House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Assistant 
Attorney General Edward S. G. Dennis observed that the 
change in 922(j) "would expand federal jurisdiction to 
permit federal prosecution for trafficking infirearms which 
have been stolen or have had the serial number removed or 
altered and which have moved in interstate commerce at 
any time." Comprehensive Violent Crime Control Act of 1989: 
Hearing on H.R. 2709 Before the Subcommittee on Crime of 
the House Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong.2d Sess. 
79-80 (1990) (emphasis added). The report of the House 
Judiciary Committee similarly notes that the amendment to 
S922(j) "expand[s] Federal jurisdiction to permit prosecution 
for transactions involving stolen firearms ... where the 
firearms have already moved in interstate or foreign 
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commerce." H.R. Rep. No. 681, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 
at 106 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. 
News 6472, 6510 (emphasis added). 
 
Sanders opines that, in enacting the 1990 amendment so 
as to expand federal jurisdiction under S922(j), Congress 
intended to do no more than eliminate the former 
requirement of contemporaneous interstate commerce 
travel at the time of the proscribed firearm trafficking 
offense. In other words, according to Sanders, the provision 
covers firearms that have come to rest after completing 
their interstate commerce journey, provided that the 
firearms were stolen at the time they moved in interstate 
commerce. As support for this position, Sanders refers us 
to United States v. Cruz, 50 F.3d 714 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. 
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S. Ct. 611 (1997). In Cruz, the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals specifically considered 
whether S922(j), as amended in 1990, applied to the receipt 
of a stolen firearm which had not traveled in interstate 
commerce after its theft. The court examined both the 
language of S922(j) and its legislative history and concluded 
that Congress's intent as to the specific scope of the statute 
remained unclear. It noted, for example, that, 
 
       [w]hile the text of [Assistant Attorney General] Dennis's 
       statement tends to support an expansive 
       interpretation, a footnote remarks that under S922(j) 
       and (k) (prior to amendment), it was an offense to 
       traffic in such firearms only `if they are actually moving 
       in or a part of interstate commerce at the time of the 
       offense,' id. at 80 n. 10, which tends to support the 
       less expansive interpretation that the legislation was 
       aimed at removing the contemporaneousness 
       requirement rather than the requirement of travel in 
       interstate commerce as a stolen weapon. 
 
50 F.3d at 718. With respect to the report of the House 
Judiciary Committee, the Ninth Circuit found the 
committee's reference to firearms that "have already moved 
in interstate ... commerce" to be ambiguous since "it could 
refer either to movement before or after the theft, or only to 
movement after the theft but before receipt." Id. 
Consequently, the court applied the rule of lenity and held 
that the statute only applies to trafficking offenses where 
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the subject firearm traveled in interstate commerce as a 
stolen firearm. 50 F.3d at 719. 
 
The government, by contrast, urges us to accept the view 
of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals as set forth in United 
States v. Honaker, 5 F.3d 160 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 
510 U.S. 1180 (1994). In that case, a majority of the circuit 
panel held that S922(j), as amended in 1990, encompasses 
cases where the stolen firearm moved in interstate 
commerce only prior to its theft. Id. at 162. The majority 
acknowledged that the language of the statute was 
somewhat ambiguous but determined that any ambiguity 
was clarified by resort to the comments of the House 
Judiciary Committee and the remarks of Assistant Attorney 
General Dennis. Id. The court found that "[t]hese two 
statements leave no doubt that Congress intended S922 (j) 
to apply to firearms that have traveled in interstate 
commerce, both prior to or after being stolen." Id. See also 
United States v. Staula, 80 F.3d 596, 605 (1st Cir. 1996) 
(holding that, under S922(j), it is sufficient if weapon floats 
in the stream of interstate commerce at some point prior to 
the commission of the offense of conviction), cert. denied, 
___ U.S. ___, 117 S. Ct. 156 (1996). 
 
We find this latter view to be more compelling than that 
taken by the Ninth Circuit in Cruz. As Judge Guy noted in 
his concurring opinion in Honaker, there is nothing in the 
legislative history of S922(j) to suggest that the sole purpose 
of the 1990 amendment was to end the statute's 
requirement of contemporaneous interstate movement. See 
5 F.3d at 164 (Guy, J., concurring). On the contrary, the 
comments of both the House Judiciary Committee and 
Assistant Attorney General Dennis regarding Congress's 
intent to expand federal jurisdiction suggest that"Congress 
sought to deploy the full extent of federal jurisdiction, as 
emanating from the Commerce Clause, to combat 
trafficking in stolen weapons." Id. Furthermore, we, like 
Judge Guy, presume that, if Congress had intended a more 
narrow purpose, it knew how to say so clearly. Cf. 18 
U.S.C.A. S2313(a) (West Supp. 1998) (proscribing 
transactions in "any motor vehicle or aircraft, which has 
crossed a State or United States boundary after being 
stolen, [by persons] knowing the same to have been stolen") 
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(emphasis added); 18 U.S.C.A. S2315 (West Supp. 1998) 
(proscribing, inter alia, transactions in certain goods, 
moneys and securities "which have crossed a State or 
United States boundary after being stolen ... [by persons] 
knowing the same to have been stolen...") (emphasis 
added). 
 
In sum, then, we conclude that S922(j), as amended in 
1990, was intended by Congress to apply to cases like this 
one where the stolen firearms traveled in interstate 
commerce only prior to their theft.2 In light of this 
conclusion, Appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel fails. There can be no Sixth Amendment 
deprivation of effective counsel based on an attorney's 
failure to raise a meritless argument. See Newsted v. 
Gibson, 158 F.3d 1085, 1090 (10th Cir. 1998) (S2254 
claim); Rodriguez v. United States, 17 F.3d 225, 226 (8th 
Cir. 1994); Shah v. United States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1162 (9th 
Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the order of the 
District Court will be affirmed. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Two other circuits have rendered unpublished decisions arriving at the 
same conclusion. See United States v. Alford, 60 F.3d 830 (Table 
Disposition No. 95-1627), 1995 WL 410983 (8th Cir. July 13, 1995); 
United States v. Andrews, 45 F.3d 428 (Table Disposition No. 94-5109), 
1994 WL 717589 (4th Cir. Dec. 29, 1994). 
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